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Executive Summary 
Cities have long been connected with processes of bureaucratisation and state building, as 
they have been to conflict and war. In bringing these two associations together Charles Tilly 
(1992) provided a useful analytical linchpin by famously highlighting the interaction between 
cities and war making as a critical factor in state making. He showed how in early modern 
Europe urban merchants struck bargains with medieval power brokers when agreeing to help 
fund wars aimed at extending or consolidating sovereignty. The intersection of cities, states 
and violent conflict remains significant today, although it manifests in different and more 
complex ways, particularly under conditions of state fragility. 
 
Cities have changed, states have changed and armed conflict itself has changed. Many cities 
in contemporary fragile states emerged as sites of colonial extraction. Urban elites today do 
not possess the same autonomy from states that provided the European urban merchant 
classes the bargaining power they were able to exercise historically. Further, in many 
developing countries state power holders tend to access capital from abroad rather than 
domestically, or fund their activities in ways that do not depend on taxation from cities. As 
taxation is generically a key component of state building, and as an urban tax base is 
generally considered critical, this uncoupling of taxation and the state-making enterprise 
constitutes a significant departure from the historical experience of mature economies. Lastly, 
and most pertinent to our argument is that conflict itself is changing. In this respect cities are 
increasingly critical locations and therefore crucial sites of political engagement and policy 
intervention.  
 
To understand these changes, we frame our discussion in relation to three forms of conflict 
and how they impact upon cities. In brief, sovereign conflict refers to situations where 
international actors are directly and explicitly involved in the war in question. Civil conflict 
refers to violent conflict between two or more organised groups one or more of which claims 
to represent part of the state itself. The struggle is for control of state institutions and/or 
territory within sovereign boundaries (though there may be outside intervention). Civic 
conflict refers to a broad array of conflict that tends to take place in cities. Our concern is not 
with constructive contestation but rather with destructive and violent manifestations of civic 
conflict including, for example, gang warfare, violent crime, terrorist acts, religious and 
sectarian riots, spontaneous rebellions and violent protests in response to perceived state 
failures. Civic conflict may spill beyond city boundaries but is associated with the distinctly 
urban quality of proximity to, and the visibility of, government. 
 
In sovereign conflicts cities – and capital cities in particular – are seen as particularly 
significant territory, so that ‘securing the city’ can become an overriding priority. This can 
persist during post-war ‘reconstruction’ processes, which often see international actors pour 
into cities where their involvement in decision making is often at the expense of local needs 
and actors, with implications for future civic conflict. Historically civil conflict has often 
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taken root in rural areas, meaning that even though cities are often the ‘prize’ to be won they 
can remain spaces of relative security during the war. Under these circumstances cities can 
become relatively autonomous, turning away from what is left of the state and seeking 
protection instead from other actors, including rebel groups, with important implications for 
state consolidation. Civic conflict is ultimately a reactive expression of grievance by urban 
populations vis-à-vis the state or other urban actors. It is important to note that it is not the 
fact that cities are inherently alienating that leads to civic conflict, but rather how power is 
structured in urban spaces.  
 
Our research suggests that civic conflict is on the rise, in relative if not absolute terms. This is 
linked in part to civil wars being in decline and being associated with urbanisation processes 
that sometimes result in civic conflict. Where civil conflicts spiral into civic ones, they 
become increasingly urban in character. External intervention in sovereign conflicts can also 
give rise to new conflicts – particularly in cities – even where the aim is ‘post-conflict’ 
reconstruction. Civil and sovereign conflicts can erode the state at city level, for example 
when cities that are struggling to cope with the impact of surrounding conflict become more 
dependent on financial transfers from the centre or where non-state actors become providers 
of urban services and compete with state institutions for legitimacy.  
 
Urban politics are critically important to the way social tensions and antagonisms are 
managed in cities. We identify four ways in which this occurs: i) manipulation of contestation 
into violent conflict; ii) deferral and/or suppression of contestation; iii) clientelist cooption of 
the aggrieved; and iv) fostering of generative engagement. Each of these has a distinct impact 
on state fragility through processes of state erosion, consolidation and transformation. The 
third and fourth of these approaches offer the best route for avoiding conflict in the medium 
and long term; but only the last is likely to allow for state transformation and dynamic 
development.  
 
Civic conflict can be positive and creative, but when violent and destructive it represents a 
significant contemporary threat to human security, state consolidation and development. 
Peace settlements and reconstruction processes brokered nationally need to take careful 
account of their impact on urban populations and the state at city level. ‘Post’-conflict urban 
stability cannot be taken for granted, especially in the context of state fragility, while 
reconstruction efforts can actually undermine the potential of cities to accommodate inclusive 
political coalitions that promote development and state transformation in the city and beyond.    
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Introduction  
Historically cities have been intrinsically linked to processes of state building and 
bureaucratisation. For example, Charles Tilly (1992) argued with respect to early modern 
Europe that power holders who fought wars to consolidate territory had to develop relations 
with urban elites who had the capital to fund such wars. The nature of these relationships and 
the bargains they entailed were fundamental to processes of state formation in Europe. 
Indeed, the interaction between wars, cities and states critically shaped European history, 
resulting in the consolidation of modern bureaucratic nation states over other forms of polity.  
 
However, the relationship between cities, states and war in low and middle income countries 
in the contemporary world is far more complex. Tilly’s analytical model of state 
transformation proved too blunt a tool for understanding this relationship today. Nevertheless, 
his work has been invaluable to ‘think with’ and his project remains an important element of 
our rubric, precisely because of his focus on the interactions between cities, processes of state 
building and violent conflict. This engagement provided us with both the questions and 
insights to interrogate the impact of cities and urban politics on state fragility, resilience and 
development, and how this is influenced by intersecting axes of violent conflict. Our 
conclusions are paradoxical: historically urban areas have been seen as the crucible of state 
making, while contemporary scholarship has focused in large measure on the political and 
democratic potential of cities (Amin and Thrift 2002; Beall and Fox 2009). Yet across much 
of the developing world urban centres have also been primary sites of state erosion: a fact that 
is often obscured by the concentration of both national wealth and state organisation in cities. 
Understanding this dual character of cities remains essential for understanding present day 
state making in fragile situations.  
 
We briefly reflect on the way in which cities, states and conflict have changed since the 
period of European state formation, highlighting the particular characteristics of cities and 
states in the contemporary developing world and why the interactions between cities, states 
and conflict have not necessarily produced consolidated bureaucratic national states. We then 
outline our tripartite typology of contemporary conflicts – distinguishing between sovereign, 
civil and civic conflict – and drawing on our extensive research, explore the ways in which 
cities are incorporated into these different forms of conflict either as targets, spaces of relative 
security, or incubators of further conflict. Lastly we suggest that in relative terms at least, 
there is a global trend towards the third form: civic conflict. Fundamentally urban in character 
this form of conflict, when allowed to become violent and destructive, arguably represents an 
enormous contemporary threat to human security worldwide.  
 
In contrast to Eric Wolf’s (1969) landmark analysis of ‘peasant wars of the twentieth 
century’, Jo Beall (2006; 2007) has argued that violent conflict has become increasingly 
urban. As a result of a diversity of processes including the tendency for invading powers to 
zone in on capital cities, mounting violence on the part of state authorities against their own 
urban populations, as well as the destructiveness of increased terrorist attacks throughout 
cities across the world, she argued that we need to think instead of ‘urban wars of the twenty-
first century’.  In conversation with this paper, Dennis Rodgers (2007; 2009) wrote about 
‘slum wars of the twenty-first century’, emphasising that violent conflict such as gang warfare 
and urban crime, although usually considered forms of ‘social violence’, can actually be seen 
as deeply political in nature. They also represent the continuation of ‘peasant wars’ by other 
means and in a new spatial setting. Beall (2009) subsequently grappled with the paradox of 
urban conflict, whereby cities are both sites and sources of creative political contestation as 
well as destructive and violent outcomes. In his study of Kampala, Tom Goodfellow (2010) 
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advanced our thinking in his explanation of why, in a city blessed by the relative absence of 
violent conflict, there was institutional gridlock and apparent lack of interest in the city and its 
institutions, at the expense of effective urban politics and planning. This overview paper is the 
result of our joint reflection on these paradoxes and provides a framework for analysing the 
rich body of research undertaken under the rubric of the Cities and Fragile States Programme 
(CAFS) of the Crisis States Research Centre.  
 
Analysis of the CAFS research confirms that civil and even sovereign conflicts are giving 
way to civic conflicts across a wide range of fragile contexts. Drawing extensively on this 
broad corpus of work, we discuss the ways in which the three heuristic forms of conflict we 
identify in our framework can and do transition, and how the rise of civic conflict appears to 
reflect a global trend. Under such circumstances we reflect on the circumstances under which 
urban political processes can channel conflict into non-violent forms of generative civic 
engagement and those under which conflict in cities is effectively deferred or suppressed. In 
linking these processes to the question of state fragility, we examine how they intersect with 
processes of state erosion, state consolidation and state transformation. The latter two are 
respectively linked to the distinction deployed by the Crisis States Research Centre between 
state resilience and dynamic development (Putzel 2008).  
 
 
Cities, states and conflict: Varying forms, evolving dynamics 
At their most basic, cities are critical loci of capital accumulation (Tilly 1989). As argued by 
Lewis Mumford (cited in Tilly 1992: 13):  
‘two great forces drive the growth of cities: the concentration of political power, 
and the expansion of productive means. Below a threshold combining minimum 
levels of power and production, only villages and bands exist.’  
However, in more recent times and under different historical conditions, power located in 
cities derives from a wider range of sources.  
 
Many developing countries experienced some form of colonisation, mostly by Europe. Pre-
colonial cities in these territories were by and large quite small and such capital accumulation 
functions they had were transformed if not destroyed by the colonial encounter. Under 
colonialism cities took on new functions, mostly related to facilitating the extraction of 
resources and the export of primary products, as well as military protection of colonial 
regimes (Beall and Fox 2009). The effect was the disproportionate growth of colonial capitals 
and ports, giving rise to primate cities without the expansion of productive means that had 
spurred urban growth in Europe (Herbst 2000). Critically, urban elites that were central to 
colonial state-building activities lacked the autonomy that their European counterparts had 
historically exercised. In other words, the subordination of (wealthy) cities to (coercive) states 
that took place over a long period of dynamic interaction in Europe was in place from the near 
outset of the colonial encounter. 
 
The urbanisation that accompanied early post-colonial experiments with import-substitution 
industrialisation was not accompanied by the anticipated expansion of productive capacities 
and urban employment, which was stunted further by the subsequent shift to primary 
commodity exportation – a trend reinforced by increasing international pressure for open 
economies. Urban populations continued to grow apace with the result that today ‘many low 
and middle-income countries are suffering the pangs of the urban transition without the 
potential benefits of extensive industrialisation’ (Beall and Fox 2009: 58). The consequence is 
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that in many fragile regions and especially in large parts of Africa, rapid urbanisation has 
proceeded with neither an autonomous urban capitalist class nor an industrial working class 
that could engage the state.  
 
States in such contexts are also very different. International borders are largely ‘fixed’ and the 
principle of national sovereignty has been established. National borders are protected 
internationally so that states no longer not have to consolidate their internal territorial power 
and legitimacy (Herbst 1996). However, the international economy has become increasingly 
integrated so that where state consolidation has not yet taken place, global pressures and 
incentives mean that both economic management and political accountability can become 
‘externalised’ (Clapham 1996). Indeed, there is an extensive literature on the intersection of 
cities and city regions as global economic hubs that operate often independently of states 
(Friedmann 1986; Friedmann and Wolf 1982; Robinson 2002, 2006; Sassen 1991, 2006; Scott 
2001; Taylor 2004). 
 
Consequently different conditions structure the behaviour of power holders and brokers in 
cities and states in different times and contexts. What remains constant is that political elites 
seek beneficial arrangements with those controlling access to resources and capital. The issue 
is how closely associated the latter are to cities. There is an enduring reliance on accessing 
international capital among former colonies and alliance partners from the Cold War era. 
More recently this has been reinforced through the mechanisms of international aid and open 
international capital flows (Moore 2001). For their part, external actors provide capital in the 
interests of accessing and stimulating emerging markets and countering existing or perceived 
global security threats. Given this context the Tillyan state-making dynamic between 
domestic coercion and domestic capital is broken.  
 
Lastly and most critically in recent decades, conflict has changed. The wars that fostered 
European state making were fought between medieval sovereigns and, once state systems 
began crystallising, between the governments of consolidated states. Yet we know that inter-
state warfare has been in decline for some decades now (Kaldor 2006; Newman 2009). Many 
commentators saw this decline as being accompanied by a rise in the number of civil wars, 
with the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001: 4) declaring: 
‘the most marked security phenomenon since the end of the Cold War has been the 
proliferation of armed conflicts within states.’ The violence of the first half of the 1990s in the 
former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and many other places seemed to validate this claim.  
 
Nevertheless, claims of a radical increase in the incidence of civil war in the late twentieth 
century are incorrect (Newman 2009). An extended debate about how to define civil war and 
on qualitative changes in the nature of warfare itself (Keen 1998; Berdal and Malone 2000; 
Kaldor 2006) overshadowed empirical evidence suggesting that both inter and intra-state war 
are in decline, lessening by nearly half in the decade immediately following the Cold War 
(Gurr et al. 2000). At the same time, many forms of low-level instability and conflict are on 
the increase (Fox and Hoelscher 2010; Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). These are difficult to 
categorise but are increasingly important in the context of rapid urbanisation.  
 
In this paper we explore different and changing forms of violent conflict in fragile settings, as 
they relate to cities. We adopt an analytical framework of conflict that goes beyond a 
categorisation based on an internal-external distinction or one between political and other 
(social and economic) forms of conflict. The parameters we identify provide an analytical 
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vehicle for exploring the ways in which cities and urban governance are implicated in violent 
conflict and its mitigation.  
 
Sovereign conflict refers to situations where international actors are directly and explicitly 
involved in warfare. Whether through international territorial disputes or their overt 
intervention in civil wars, sovereignty is challenged in juridical or political terms. Cities are 
affected by sovereign conflicts insofar as they invariably involve attempts to capture and 
control capital cities, which along with primate cities are important containers of sovereignty. 
Control of capital cities can obviate the need to seize the whole territory because they are 
generally seats of executive authority, sites of economic wealth and centres of political power. 
As such they constitute what Putzel (2010) identifies as ‘significant territory’, by virtue of 
their symbolic and leverage value.  
  
Civil conflict or war refers to violent conflict between two or more relatively organised 
groups within sovereign boundaries. One or more of these groups represents (or claims to 
represent) part of the state or is fighting for control of all or part of it. In civil conflicts parties 
to the conflict are politically and militarily organised within sovereign boundaries (though 
there is often external support) and have publicly stated political objectives (as well as often 
unstated economic objectives) (Cramer 2002; Keen 1998). The government or the group 
representing the state is invariably a principal combatant and one or more of the groups 
involved must be seeking to take control of part of the state, supplant or restrict core functions 
of the state in a given geographic area. A party in revolt must exercise some de facto authority 
over a part of the national territory and its population. In other words, in civil war the 
monopoly of violence formerly held by the state is already partially taken over by rebels, 
local warlords, organised criminal groups or private militias. Lastly, the weaker party must be 
able to mount effective resistance to the stronger party over a sustained period (Sambanis 
2004). 
 
Contemporary civil conflicts have been fought without respect to conventional rules of 
engagement. On the contrary, often they have been intent on generating fear among non-
combatants, destabilising social and economic structures and sometimes targeting particular 
groups as in ‘ethnic cleansing’. Classically, civil conflicts have been closely associated with 
terrain, such as the proximity of ethnic groups to homeland territories, and the social and 
military attributes of rural areas where military organisation can more easily take place 
beyond state reach (Kalyvas 2006). More recently, based on studies of civil conflict in the 
Middle East and South Asia, research has shown that cities also provide the social 
infrastructure for sustained armed resistance to state power (Staniland 2010). Our research 
suggests that the relationship between civil conflict and urban areas is complex. Cities 
sometimes serve as places of refuge or relative security during conflict, become economic 
hubs in war economies, or become sites of insurgency and combat, particularly when civil 
conflict overlaps with civic conflict. 
 
Civic conflict we see as the violent expression of grievances (which may be social, political or 
economic) vis-à-vis the state or other actors. It refers to diverse but recurrent forms of 
violence between individuals and groups that might include organised violent crime, gang 
warfare, terrorism, religious and sectarian rebellions, and spontaneous riots or violent protest 
over state failures such as poor or absent service delivery. Civic conflicts can sometimes 
overlap with civil conflict, insofar as they may involve high levels of organisation, powerful 
economic interests, or the presence of elements of the state, which can sometimes turn against 
its own citizens, for example during forced evictions.  However, civic conflict differs from 
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civil conflict in that it is ultimately a reactive process. While civil conflict can be thought of 
as essentially instrumental, civic conflict can be both expressive or involve attempts to 
reconfigure power relations, although this may fall short of taking control of formal structures 
of power.  
 
Civic conflict generally takes place in cities, which provide the physical and social 
infrastructure for significant mobilisation and insurgency against marginalisation or state 
neglect. It is closely linked to state failures to cope with the demands and challenges of 
urbanisation. Although civic conflict may spill beyond city boundaries, and there can be 
commonalities and intersections between civil and civic conflicts, civic conflict is 
fundamentally urban in nature and is often associated with urban qualities such as density, 
diversity and compressed inequality (Beall et al. 2010; Rodgers 2010). Although a broad 
concept that cannot be specified too rigidly, we argue that violent civic conflict: a) is 
generally linked to state failures to provide security, growth and welfare in urban areas; b) 
consists of violent events that may be isolated or connected by a sustained organised 
campaign or set of political demands; c) rarely involves an attempt to take permanent control 
of the state, even in part; and d) is consequently less ‘all or nothing’ or ‘indivisible’ 
(Hirschmann 1994; Di John 2008; 2010) than sovereign and civil conflict and thus, in theory, 
more amenable to resolution. It is the link with the state and the association with citizenship 
(Earle 2010) that leads us to use the term ‘civic conflict’ rather than social, economic or 
political violence, although what we consider under the rubric of civic conflict has also been 
described in these terms (Fox and Hoelscher 2010; Moser and McIlwaine 2006).  
 
The tripartite construct of sovereign, civil and civic conflict provides a useful analytical 
framework – as opposed to a rigid typology or an ‘absolute’ classificatory system – for 
analysing the ways in which cities and conflict intersect at a time when conflict is changing 
but where there is little consensus as to the fundamental character of this change. It also 
accommodates fluidity and porosity between these three heuristic forms of conflict. Our 
analysis suggests that contestation – understood as an inevitable condition and consequence 
of development and change – can either be channelled destructively through conflict 
(understood as violent conflict) or in a more constructive way through generative forms of 
engagement. 
 
 
Cities as critical locations in different forms of conflict  
In this section we look more closely at the three forms of conflict and their modes of 
interaction with cities. In sovereign conflicts, capital cities are of unmistakeable importance 
given that in a given state they are the sites where sovereign authority is concentrated. In war, 
‘the main criterion international actors look for is control of the capital city – a test that 
reflects certain facts on the ground but does not require the majority of the state to be under 
control’ (Landau-Wells 2008). While the ‘city-as-target’ has long been a feature of warfare 
(see for example Bishop and Clancey 2003), the way in which cities – and especially capital 
cities – are involved in sovereign conflicts has changed. As resource and population intensive 
sites, cities have always been targets for attack but they are increasingly sites of resistance as 
well. For example, in response to the onslaught by US and UK forces on cities such as Basra, 
Baghdad, Kandahar and Kabul, belligerents in countries under attack have increasingly 
resorted to forms of ‘asymmetric warfare’ that tend to involve unpredictable acts of terror as 
opposed to more ‘conventional’ military approaches (Hills 2004).  
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The urban implications of this are clear. For foreign invaders, ‘taking the capital’ or other 
major cities has seemed a sure route to a decisive victory, but increasingly populations 
without equivalence in military technology have taken to urban resistance and unpredictable 
violent combat. The result is what Arjun Appadurai (1996: 152-3) has called ‘the implosion 
of global and national politics into the urban world’, ushering in a ‘new phase in the life of 
cities’, where enmities have been transformed into ‘scenarios of unrelieved urban terror’. This 
‘urbanisation of insurgency’ has posed enormous challenges to conventional military practice. 
Urban insurgents under attack in Iraq and Afghanistan have exploited the physical 
characteristics of their cities to force US military personnel to come into very close proximity, 
thereby exposing them to much higher casualty risk (Graham 2007: 8). Western democracies 
– which incidentally have been the prime wagers of sovereign wars (CSRC 2008) – expect 
quick decisive victories based on superior technology and are particularly vulnerable to 
‘asymmetric’ strategies that are casualty-intensive, unpredictable and protracted (Coker 1992; 
2002). In the US and beyond this has resulted in a ‘revolution in military affairs’ and 
technological innovations so that ‘surgical’ operations can be conducted in cities with the aim 
of zero casualties on the invading side (Graham 2007: 18; Coker 2002).  
 
Even during lulls in combat or periods of reconstruction, international decision making 
impacts on cities. Research on Kabul explored the way in which international involvement in 
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan’s capital city led to the marginalisation of the city’s 
interests as an urban centre. The city became a symbolic epicentre of state building, an 
important site of national reconstruction and remains the primary locus of the international 
presence in the country. Yet ironically the city itself is in dire straits. It has mushroomed in 
size – in large part as a result of on-going conflict across the country at large – yet 
international decision makers operate ‘over the heads’ of municipal actors and local interests. 
This phenomenon Daniel Esser (2009) refers to as the ‘over-determination’ of urban 
governance, where the axis connecting national and international agencies is the most 
powerful one, formulating policies and determining institutional structures and relations in the 
urban realm, at the expense of city level actors and citizens. Indeed, urban planning became 
an integral part of international engagement in ‘post’-conflict Kabul, placing national and 
internationally security concerns above the long-term coherence of city planning (Beall and 
Esser 2005). 
 
The case of Dili in Timor Leste also shows how the presence of large numbers of 
international actors in a conflict-affected city can exacerbate tensions. Here their presence and 
activities created the illusion of sustained employment and other opportunities that were in 
fact fragile and finite. At the same time the urban policies and planning that should have been 
put in place were neglected (Moxham 2008). These insights necessarily modify perceptions of 
what appear to be, but in fact are not, urban-biased reconstruction efforts and alert us to the 
need to pay due attention to structural and socio-economic shifts that can occur in cities as a 
result of war and over the longer term can lead to yet more conflict in the city itself. We 
explore this link between sovereign and civic conflict below. 
 
The capture of cities as confirmation of victory is also a goal in many civil conflicts. 
Contemporary sovereign wars often involve formidable air power that moves directly on 
cities to ensure a quick and decisive win (Landau-Wells 2008). By contrast, in civil wars the 
capture of cities tends to be the end point, often after protracted periods of guerrilla warfare or 
armed combat, often conducted in the countryside. The struggle to capture capital cities can 
ultimately stand in the way of peace. Our research richly amplifies the difficulties that a 
single military organisation can face in trying to capture both the cities and countryside, 
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prolonging civil war as illustrated by our studies of Afghanistan (Giustozzi 2009) and 
Mozambique (Sumich and Honwana 2007). A consequence is that for substantial periods of 
time capitals and other significant cities can be places of relative calm and security during 
civil war. A typical example is Kinshasa, which has been a relative island of calm in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a country ravaged by conflict (Freund 2009; 
Kapagama and Waterhouse 2009). This last point has far-reaching implications. First, it 
generally leads to the influx of rural or displaced populations into cities, leading to massive 
urban growth, evident for example in Kinshasa but also Luanda during Angola’s protracted 
civil war (Beall 2007).  
 
For cities to provide a haven in civil conflicts is fairly common. In Kashmir, for example, 
conflict has been confined largely to the hinterlands, while Srinagar supported a large migrant 
population that sought security and livelihoods in the city, as well as many ‘floating’ elements 
of the military and paramilitary forces (Venkatachalam 2007: 23). Smaller, regional urban 
centres are also affected by civil conflict as illustrated by the case of Gulu in Northern 
Uganda. Here rural populations were displaced on an enormous scale as a result of the war 
between the Ugandan state and the Lord’s Resistance Army; and while Gulu remained ‘a 
haven of relative safety’ throughout the civil war, with the cessation of hostilities it 
mushroomed in size from a modest provincial town to become Uganda’s second largest city 
(Branch 2008). In some parts of Colombia too, conflict has seen the relative clearing out of 
some rural areas as people move into towns, with rural parts of the South Bolivar region 
losing between 50-70 percent of their population to urban centres (Vargas 2009: 10).  
 
Hence, somewhat counter intuitively, rapid urbanisation and urban stability often go hand in 
hand when a civil war is raging nearby. During most of the two decades of guerrilla struggle 
in Nicaragua during the 1960s and 1970s – until the final stages in 1978-1979 – and then 
again during the ‘Contra’ war that broke out in the 1980s, military action was largely 
confined to the countryside and the capital city, Managua, remained peaceful even as it grew 
(Rodgers 2009). Similarly Quetta, situated in a conflict-prone region on Pakistan’s border 
with Afghanistan, has grown extremely rapidly and absorbed a potentially explosive 
combination of rival ethnic and sectarian groups, yet it ‘has historically witnessed relative 
peace between its major communities’: even when the conflicts in which the region is 
engulfed have entered the city they have done so only to a limited extent (Gazdar et al. 2010: 
6-7). Within Afghanistan throughout the turbulent 1980s, cities had a seeming ‘protective 
screen’ that insulated them from the violence. Even after this screen was dramatically 
smashed in the capital city certain major urban centres, such as Mazar-i Sharif and Herat, 
managed to stay relatively peaceful under the dominance of significant warlords (Giustozzi 
2009: 11).  
 
One reason for this is that elites actively involved in warfare often work hard to keep cities 
secure, even if they are benefiting from the conflict at large, as is evident in Quetta in 
Pakistan (Gazdar et al. 2010). Cities play a vital role in war economies and as hubs in 
associated national and transnational networks, which might be jeopardised by open urban 
conflict. Moreover, elites themselves are often resident in cities and are averse to exposure to 
conflict, often wielding consolidated coercive power to prevent conflict impacting too hard on 
urban centres, as was the case with the warlords dominating Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat. Thus 
in the mid 1990s in the midst of civil war the economies of these cities were actually doing 
rather well by comparison with the rest of the country, including relative to Kabul and 
Kandahar where no groupings had managed to consolidate control (Giustozzi 2009: 11-12). In 
Colombia, the relative security of towns in South Bolivar was similarly found to be linked, in 
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part at least, to the fact that municipal governments were often co-opted by insurgents, who in 
one case signalled ‘their intent on replacing the state’ by pledging ‘to protect the town from 
petty criminals’ (Vargas 2009: 6). It seems, therefore, that there are two principal 
circumstances under which cities come to be the ‘eye of the storm’ in civil conflict: when 
insurgent parties have not been able to penetrate the city; or when there are deliberate 
strategies on the part of warring parties or economic elites with access to the city to prioritise 
urban security.  
 
Under such circumstances cities can become increasingly autonomous vis-à-vis the central 
state. A clear example is Goma in Eastern DRC, a town that in the context of the devastating 
violence and bloodshed of the Congo wars (1996-2003) began in many ways to thrive. With 
the central state largely incapacitated, the city’s residents benefited directly from being the 
focal point for cross-border transactions between the densely populated, mineral-rich eastern 
part of the country and the regional markets of Rwanda and Uganda. Goma was increasingly 
seen as a place of opportunity with its own distinct ‘transboundary’ identity. At the same time 
it was the headquarters of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie rebel movement 
and viewed as a ‘rebel’ city, increasing its sense of autonomy from a state largely based in 
Kinshasa, almost two-thousand kilometres to the west (Vlassenroot and Buescher 2009: 14). 
Like Italian city states such as Genoa in early modern Europe, Goma’s autonomy was built 
primarily on trade and the power of trading elites (Tilly and Blockmans 1994), but the city’s 
independent stance has also been fuelled by its role in civil conflict and as a regional centre of 
gravity for international intervention.  
 
The relationship between civic conflict and cities is relatively straightforward because 
locationally civil conflict generally takes place within cities and it is invariably directly 
related to the socio-economic and spatial particularities of cities. While civil conflict involves 
groups seeking to impose their will on populations and territories, civic conflict is more 
reactive and often reflects the relative powerlessness of some urban populations, vis-à-vis 
elite groups or state institutions seeking control over them. In these circumstances the state 
neither fully suppresses nor fully gives people voice, leading to expressions of grievance 
against the state and dominant groups in various ‘asymmetric’ forms of conflict ranging from 
crime to mass rioting to terrorism. In short, civic conflict can be thought of as the myriad 
forms of domestic asymmetric warfare against city-based elites, or sometimes against their 
clients.  
 
To a degree it is possible to distinguish between civic conflict among different elements of 
urban society (such as gang warfare, ethnic pogroms, violent crime) and that between state 
and society (for example violent riots, terrorism, violence towards state personnel and 
property or state violence towards citizens). However, the distinction is rarely clear-cut and 
our research demonstrates that civic conflict generally implicates the state, either directly or 
indirectly. The communal riots that have scarred the history of Ahmedabad in Western India 
and which erupted with particular force in 2002 represent, on the face of it, conflict between 
Hindu and Muslim elements in the city. Yet Hindu ethno-religious identity also became 
associated with an exclusionary state-making project in Gujarat, with the state deploying its 
power in the service of one religious group over another (Chandhoke 2009: 7). Ultimately the 
state ‘refrained from either preventing Hindu mobs from implementing their macabre designs, 
or from protecting Muslim citizens’ (Chandhoke 2009: 4).  
 
Systemic discrimination and neglect embodied in state institutions at the city and supra-urban 
levels are central to almost all civic conflicts. Rodgers (2009: 960) argues for the specificity 
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of the urban realm, as a locus of political power and population concentration and as such it is 
the ‘disjuncture between the two that generally leads to the emergence of urban violence … 
not the fact that cities are putatively inherently alienating spaces’ (see also Rodgers 2010). 
Our research suggests that civic conflicts appear to be an increasing feature of the urban 
experience, certainly as they are associated with transitions from civil and sovereign conflicts 
or their aftermath. In the following section we trace the dynamics by which conflict 
transforms itself or can be transformed by external interventions, helping make sense of the 
seeming paradox that cities can be islands of stability and security in the midst of conflict, are 
not inherently alienating or antagonistic places, and yet are associated with some of the 
bloodiest violence of recent times.  
 
Civic conflict and conflict transitions  
Conflicts are not static and can reshape themselves in response to new threats, shifting 
objectives, fresh actors and changing economic circumstances. Sovereign, civil and civic 
conflicts become layered upon or replace one another. In Iraq, for example, sovereign conflict 
has been focused on cities, which has triggered spiralling civil and civic conflict, leading to a 
disastrous combination and reinforcement of all three in the on-going hostilities in this 
country. This section examines the dynamics of such transitions and explores their causes and 
consequences. We begin with a brief examination of some of the interactive effects between 
sovereign, civil and civic conflicts and then explore how the cessation of civil war can 
actually generate civic conflict, with important implications for peace and reconstruction 
policy interventions.  
 
The case studies most clearly illustrating how the involvement of external sovereign powers 
can jeopardise the stability and security provided by cities in civil conflicts are those from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Karachi, for example, sovereign conflict over the border in 
Afghanistan and increasing international involvement in the city itself, fuelled by concerns 
over the ‘Jihadi threat’, exacerbated  civil fragmentation and civic conflict, rendering the city 
itself a growing locus of state fragility in Pakistan (Budhani et al. 2010). Karachi’s reputation 
as a site for the operation of criminal and terrorist organisations has become self-fulfilling in a 
context where working through subterranean social networks predisposed to violence has 
virtually become an ‘acceptable’ way of doing things. The operations connected with the ‘war 
on terror’ have only served to exacerbate this tendency, with the effect that the city has 
become more, rather than less, violent.  
 
The ‘over-determination’ of cities in the process of reconstruction after civil conflict is 
explored by Esser (2009) with respect to Kabul. Such over-determination can also lay 
foundations for a new sovereign conflict, as illustrated by the case of Lebanon. Hoeckel 
(2007) argues that the concentration of post-conflict reconstruction in the central business 
district of Beirut during the 1990s dramatically failed to integrate both the city’s periphery 
and its rural hinterlands, with the effect that they became highly vulnerable to extremist 
takeover in the form of Hezbollah, leading ultimately to the Israeli invasion of 2006. Similar 
dynamics were identified in Nicaragua where the economic over-determination of the capital 
city of Managua during recent decades gave rise to increased conflict between different 
factions of the urban elite that spilled over into widespread civic violence in the city at times, 
especially following the re-election in 2006 of the Sandinista leader, Daniel Ortega (Rodgers 
2008).  The policy lesson here is that the tendency in ‘post’-conflict contexts to exploit the 
capacity of cities to act as sites of symbolic reconstruction projects should be resisted or 
treated with caution, especially if this is at the expense of addressing the needs of wider local 
populations within integrated metropolitan initiatives.  
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With the cessation of civil conflict in Dili, the focus on reconstructing the capital city 
followed patterns similar to those observed in Kabul and Beirut. A strongly neoliberal 
approach to reconstruction, rooted in the capital city, fell prey to two fatal oversights: one was 
the neglect of poverty alleviation and agricultural production in the countryside and the other, 
a neglect of poverty alleviation and job creation in the city itself. The focus on supposed 
‘national’ development priorities in Timor Leste emanating from the city but without specific 
attention to either rural or urban development needs proved disastrous. The result was the 
influx of villagers to the city due to perceptions that development and opportunity lay there. 
Yet the drastic absence of urban infrastructure, services and jobs lead to the explosion of civic 
conflict in Dili on a huge scale in 2006, just a few years after the civil war leading to Timor 
Leste’s independence had officially ended (Moxham 2008). The failure in the transition out of 
civil conflict to plan for the specific spatial dimensions of development and reconstruction 
across rural and urban areas had the consequence of civil conflict simply reappearing in urban 
settings in the form of civic conflict. Rivalries between ‘Easterners’ and ‘Westerners’, which 
in fact were historically very weak and vague, were given added salience in the urban setting: 
‘It took Dili, housing the failures of national-level disintegration and heightened insecurity, 
for these regional identities to emerge in opposition to each other’ (Moxham 2008: 14).   
 
If civil conflicts drive urbanisation – and we have observed that this tends to be the case – 
then civic conflict is a common, one might even say normal, response to that rapid 
urbanisation. For example, in Northern Uganda during the civil war the regional town of Gulu 
was a haven of relative stability but it has been suggested that ‘if Gulu town is to become 
destabilised internally or if its population is to become a destablising influence in the region, 
this would only occur, perhaps counter-intuitively, after the war ends’ (Branch 2008: 2, 
emphasis in original). Conditions that emerged in the town during the decades in which it was 
the eye in the storm of the Ugandan northern civil war included the dramatic rise in the 
authority of women and youth relative to male elders. The surrounding war has resulted in a 
transformation of the lives of women that is ‘nothing short of historic’ (Branch 2008: 11), as 
they adopted new political, social and economic roles, higher levels of education and 
sustained engagement with the NGO community and the government. In addition, many 
young ex-Lord’s Resistance Army combatants sought refuge and anonymity in the town, 
which in general had been ‘at the cutting edge of the changes introduced into Acholi society 
as a result of war and displacement, and as such has served as a haven for many of those for 
whom those changes are beneficial’ (Branch 2008: 14-15).  However, these changes also had 
a fundamentally traumatic impact on Acholi society, and the end of the civil war saw the 
standing of some (primarily older men) decline as a result of the urbanisation brought about 
by the war, with the possibility that they may attempt to reconstitute their authority. In other 
words, the occurrence of civic conflict – which Branch identifies as a distinct future 
possibility – will only happen once the civil conflict is over. Strange though this seems, it is in 
fact an increasingly common pattern.  
 
Another way in which the management of the transition out of civil conflict can foster civic 
conflict is when sanctions are used by the international community to bring civil war to an 
end. Keen (2009) notes the danger that sanctions can worsen matters by leading to feelings of 
victimisation and increased hardship and this can ultimately lead to civic conflict whether the 
civil war has ended or not. Sanctions hit cities particularly hard – Keen cites the effects of 
sanctions on the industrial centre of Yangon, Myanmar – and can create a general 
environment of neglect, decay and criminalisation in cities that provides fertile ground for the 
asymmetric expression of grievances to emerge. Even the lifting of sanctions as conflict 
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comes to an end can sow the seeds of further urban conflict. In Iraq this process ‘created 
economic hardship in towns associated with sanctions busting, including Fallujah, and this 
fed into the subsequent insurgency’ (Keen 2009: 17). There are also many non-economic 
routes to civic conflict in the ‘post-conflict’ transitional period. Where peace processes are 
not sufficiently inclusive, ‘underlying causes of violence are likely to remain unaddressed; 
excluding large sections of civil society [which] will tend to prolong, or even exaggerate, 
their grievances’ (Keen 2009: 25). In addition, the question of disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration can take a huge toll on cities, which tend to be the spatial location for the 
‘reintegration’ of ex-combatants into society. As Utas (2005, cited in Keen 2009: 27) points 
out in relation to Liberia, ‘[m]arginalisation appears to be the norm for a large proportion of 
young urbanites. Thus re-marginalisation and not reintegration is the natural outcome 
awaiting most ex-combatants.’  
 
Matters are often made worse when new arrangements for policing are mismanaged after civil 
war in the panic to maintain security, resulting in politicised and fragmented urban police 
forces. With regard to contemporary Iraq it has been noted that under such circumstances the 
police have the confidence of neither the military nor the civil society they are empowered to 
protect, resulting in the involvement of citizen militias that further destabilise the security 
situation (Davis 2007: 8). Few conquering forces in recent civil wars can have had less 
understanding of city life than the Taliban, who were both ideologically hostile to urban life 
and had little or no exposure to it at either the level of leadership or rank and file (Herold 
2004; Giustozzi 2009). Interestingly, under their rule in the late 1990s civic conflict broke out 
in the form of urban revolts in Mazar-i Sharif and Herat – the same two cities that had 
remained largely insulated from conflict during earlier periods of the civil war. Rather than 
the urban population as a whole rising up against the Taliban these revolts were sectarian in 
character; but it is significant that it was these particular cities, which had managed to remain 
stable during the civil war due to their containment from events in rural areas, that erupted 
‘when faced with the domination of hostile groups coming in from the villages’ (Giustozzi 
2009: 14-15). What these examples suggest is that when sovereign or civil war formally 
comes to an end, some of the very factors linked to the relative stability of cities during the 
war can themselves become sources of new civic conflicts.  
 
Our emphasis on civic conflict serves to draw attention to the fact that interrelated social, 
economic and political changes have resulted in an urbanisation of conflict. The changes in 
post Cold War warfare have been conceptualised by Kaldor (2006) and extensively debated 
(for an overview see Di John 2008; 2010); the impact of contemporary international conflicts 
on cities has been highlighted (Bishop and Clancey 2003; Graham 2004; 2007; 2010); and the 
increased relevance of more prosaic forms of urban violence has been convincingly argued 
(Caldeira, 1996; Moser and McIlwaine 2006; Rodgers 2006; Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). 
Notwithstanding their insights, these debates have largely come into being in isolation of one 
another and have neglected the links between conflict, social and economic dynamics and 
political change. In the following section we turn to the question of urban political 
institutions, leading us back to the issue of state fragility itself.  
 
Urban politics: Violent civic conflict and generative engagement 
A key condition affecting the likelihood of progress towards peace in divided cities – along 
with control of land, the distribution of economic benefits and threats to group identity – is 
the extent to which a wide range of urban dwellers have access to policy making and the 
political process (Bollens 2007: 11). Notwithstanding high-profile contentious events such as 
disputed elections, our city studies illustrate that the failure to provide and institutionalise 
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vehicles for non-violent interaction over civic issues – or what we term ‘generative civic 
engagement’ – often leads to violent civic conflict. Instead social tensions and antagonisms 
are manipulated or, where the state has the authority and coercive capacity, are suppressed or 
deferred in the interests of elites.  
 
This is not inevitable. Political processes and coalitions can be developmental, with greater 
inclusiveness reducing civic conflict, as illustrated by the case Bogotá and Medellín. 
Colombia has been ravaged by civil conflict for decades, with government and paramilitary 
forces fighting across different parts of the country for over four decades. Homicide rates in 
the three major cities, Bogotá, Medellín and Cali, were among the worst in the world for 
much of the 1980s and 1990s, with the violence in these cities being related in part to the 
wider civil conflict, with paramilitaries and other political actors implicated in urban criminal 
networks, especially in Medellín. As such, Colombia’s major cities were never really the ‘eye 
of the storm’ in the country’s civil conflict, although the smaller towns of South Bolivar may 
have played this role (see Vargas 2009). In the late 1980s intellectuals asserted that ‘more 
than the violence in the mountains what is killing us is the violence in the cities’ (Sanchez 
1987, cited in Gutierrez et al. 2008).  
 
The Colombian state, in contrast to many states suffering prolonged insurgency, had delivered 
impressive economic growth and showed surprising effectiveness in some of its capacities 
(Gutierrez et al. 2008; Ramos 2010). Since the 1990s, Bogotá and Medellín have also seen an 
extraordinary reduction in civic conflict, described by Gutierrez et al. (2009) as a 
‘metropolitan miracle’. Against a backdrop of soaring levels of urban violence, a fresh style 
of politics accompanied the new 1991 constitution. This allowed for wider political 
participation and debate, which in turn saw coalitions of essentially middle class and elite 
interests emerge. They were politically heterogeneous but homogeneous in their collective 
commitment to the provision of public goods targeted at wider urban society but ultimately 
for their own benefit as well. Simply put, ‘the bourgeoisie discovered that its own interests sat 
well with the urban modernisation programmes’ proposed by the capital city’s mayor. 
Consequently a relatively diverse combination of urban interest groups, who traditionally had 
pitted their interests against one another and continued to do so in other cities such as Cali, 
came together in the realisation that ‘the factionalism of traditional politics made collective 
action difficult and the costs paid in terms of the need of provision of private security were 
too high’ (Gutierrez et al. 2009: 14).  
 
The ‘miracle’ was achieved by the particular configuration of the political coalitions forged in 
the two cities at critical junctures alongside the creation of institutions and processes for 
generative engagement. The subsequent drop in homicide rates was not achieved in the third 
city, Cali, where a developmental coalition did not emerge and where violent civic conflict 
persists. In Bogotá and Medellín it was the presence of a substantial and differentiated vocal 
urban middle class that made the critical difference. Had only a narrow coalition of dominant 
elites been involved in decision making, the costs of providing private security for themselves 
would not be prohibitive and thus the motivation for broader urban public good provision 
would not have been present. Indeed, this is what has arguably occurred in contemporary 
Managua, the capital city of Nicaragua (Rodgers 2008). 
 
The formation of developmental urban coalitions in Bogotá and Medellín is one of the most 
compelling examples we have of institutionalised mechanisms for generative civic 
engagement in a persistently fragile state. However, it is important not to overplay the 
inclusionary nature of class coalitions in these cities as elsewhere. The majority of poor urban 
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residents in Bogotá and Medellín were not welcomed into public debate and attention needs 
to be paid to the ‘illusion of the bourgeoisie that the defence of its interests equals the defence 
of society as a whole’ (Gutierrez et al. 2009: 15). While there has been a reduction in violent 
crime and homicides, the institutionalisation of mechanisms to allow for the articulation and 
negotiation of conflicts between the lower and higher rungs of urban society needs further 
attention.  
 
The case of Ahmedabad illustrates what can happen when a broader Colombia-style coalition 
with shared interests in the promotion of generative civic engagement is absent. Here 
communal differences between Hindus and Muslims were manipulated and heightened 
(Chandhoke 2010). Antagonisms are long-standing, dating back to the fact that Muslims did 
not generally participate in the anti-colonial struggle and have been persistently reproduced in 
the city, exacerbated since 1995 when the Bharatiya Janata Party took power, further 
politicising Hindu identity and binding it closely to the state (Chandoke 2009). Historical 
failures on the part of civil society organisations throughout much of the twentieth century 
also contributed to the failure of channels for generative civic engagement to emerge. For 
example, trade unions in the city failed to develop a working class culture and identity and 
neighbourhood politics also failed to transcend caste and religious barriers (Chandhoke 2009: 
22-3). It then only takes a certain historical contingency – which in Ahmedabad came in the 
form of the rise to power of the religious right – to provide ‘the trigger for the translation 
from non-associationalism to violence’ (Chandhoke 2009: 29).  
 
However, for every Bogotá there is a Bangkok. Here a coalition between the urban middle 
classes and the monarchist elite led to the Thai military coup in 2006, which was followed by 
a narrowing of political space (Glassman 2010) and consequent turmoil as the rural and urban 
poor alike took to the city streets in the name of a greater say in the affairs of the state. The 
Thai case is also a reminder that urban middle classes can often be conservative, seeking to 
obstruct changes promoted by political forces that seek greater public spending in the interests 
of the poor. The elite-middle class coalition in Thailand in many ways caused an explosion of 
new civic conflict in the context of the narrowing of space for generative civic engagement, 
resulting in what Glassman (2010: 1318) terms a period of ‘post-democracy’, which can 
precipitate violence. In Colombia it was sky-high levels of urban violence that provided the 
stimulus for a developmental elite-middle class coalition to emerge.  
 
The same can be said of the city of Durban and the KwaZulu-Natal region during the 
transition from apartheid. Alongside other factors, a weariness of violent civic conflict 
propelled disparate elite and middle class groupings into the inclusive developmental 
coalition that ultimately secured peace and political stability for the city and province (Beall 
and Ngonyama 2009). Forging channels for creative political encounter between different 
social classes in cities is integral to forging generative engagement. Violent civic conflict can 
precipitate the necessary institutional change, as in the Colombian and South African cases, or 
it can be the result of a failure to do so, as illustrated by the cities of Ahmedabad and 
Bangkok. The lack of channels for civic engagement can result in the manipulation of social 
tensions into extremely violent conflict outcomes.  
 
No coalitions, no matter how inclusive or developmental are set in stone. They are challenged 
by those who are excluded from them or by those whose influence changes as a result of 
them. In Maputo, Mozambique, for example, the stability of the FRELIMO regime has in 
large part depended on its coalition with the urban middle classes. This is increasingly being 
called into question as that middle class comes to see itself as excluded (Sumich 2007). While 
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they continue to support FRELIMO in electoral terms, there has been a hollowing out of the 
regime’s support base and its supremacy seems to stem more from a lack of credible 
alternatives than anything else. In part because of the urban base of the regime, the ruling elite 
has sought to increase its influence by extending the state’s reach into the countryside, and 
consequently has paid little attention to rising poverty, inequality and crime in urban areas. 
Feelings of disenfranchisement in urban areas are now common to the urban middle classes 
and low income residents alike, resulting in the 2008 riots: ‘the most dramatic indication that 
the social contract between rulers and ruled is being broken’ (Sumich 2010: 5).  
 
FRELIMO’s experience in Maputo illustrates how a loss of faith in the state after a period of 
raised expectations can drive civic conflict. In fragile states emerging from prolonged civil 
conflicts, military organisations that eventually win victory sometimes transform themselves 
into political organisations and usher in extended periods of peace and stability. They can 
benefit from a considerable ‘peace dividend’ whereby they enjoy the support of a majority of 
the population fatigued from conflict. Promising national renewal, democracy, growth and 
improvements in the quality of life for all, for a certain period of time they can enjoy high 
levels of good will among a population grateful for their achievement of ending the war and 
ushering in a legitimate state. In such situations persistent social tensions and antagonism are 
‘deferred’, with people prioritising peace and security over asserting demands against the 
state or other social groups. However, there is a limit to how long these ‘latent’ conflicts can 
be deferred if new ruling elites fail to deliver on all their promises, as recent events in Maputo 
illustrate.  
 
The ‘deferral’ of social conflict can take the form of active suppression. This was the case in 
post-genocide Rwanda where the state is relatively strong, centralised and has significant 
reach. The horrific events of 1994 and the civil war leading up to it and certain aspects of 
Rwanda’s long history as a relatively autonomous kingdom contributed to a generalised 
submission to state power, enabling a regime with an ambitious agenda for state consolidation 
and economic growth to restrict political debate that might hinder rapid progress (Goodfellow 
and Smith 2009; Beswick 2010). Moreover, in nations torn apart by war ordinary citizens can 
be suspicious of organised politics of any kind. Hence the cessation of violent civil and civic 
conflict may not accompanied by the opening up of channels for non-violent and generative 
civic engagement. Despite the Rwandan government’s admirable ambitions, the possibility 
that civic conflict is effectively being deferred, with potentially dangerous implications for the 
future cannot be discounted (Goodfellow and Smith: forthcoming). 
 
Under such circumstances the risk is that unexpressed and pent-up grievances could result in 
further and potentially much more destructive civil conflict. Indeed, what the police termed 
‘isolated’ grenade attacks in Kigali in December 2008, January 2009, February 2010, March 
2010 and May 2010 looked increasingly less isolated in the run-up to the 2010 presidential 
election and more like asymmetric civic conflict. Kigali, the capital and only large city in the 
country, offers the best opportunity for an ethnically inclusive and interlinked civil society, an 
autonomous private sector facilitating middle class growth, and institutions for political 
conflict to develop (Goodfellow and Smith: forthcoming). It is in cities that there is the 
concentration of diverse actors and the proximity of state institutions that can potentially 
allow for violent civic conflict to be channelled into institutionalised forms of political debate, 
participation and interaction. When this does not occur, the likelihood of violent expressions 
of urban conflict emerging is not only high but can spread from the city scale to that of the 
national state.  
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Impact of urban conflict on state fragility: Erosion, consolidation and transformation  
Thus far we have explored and illustrated how cities are implicated in the three forms of 
conflict discussed, paying particular attention to civic conflict given its increased prevalence 
and importance for human security. In this section we consider the implications of the city-
conflict nexus for state fragility based on the different ways in which potential civic conflict 
in cities can be managed. As noted, our research shows that unlike in Tilly’s historical 
analysis, contemporary cities and states rarely become more integrated as a result of violent 
conflict. At best, state making is assisted by a weariness and fear of further violence; but 
while violent conflict is not usually constitutive of state formation today, cities can be and are 
places where the underlying dynamics of civic conflict translate into processes that are 
constitutive of state building. This section analyses the ways in which the interaction between 
conflict and cities can impact on state fragility, for better and for worse.  
 
State fragility can be impacted by three key processes: state erosion, consolidation and 
transformation. The relationship between state erosion and consolidation is fairly 
straightforward: they are essentially opposite processes, referring to the extent to which a 
state’s monopoly of violence and its administrative capacity are undermined or strengthened.  
Conflict tends towards state erosion, but by exploring the urban scale we can understand how 
this takes place locally, with important policy implications.  Civil and sovereign conflicts tend 
to erode states at the local level in ways that are often overlooked. For example, we have 
noted how cities are often the ‘eye of the storm’ in civil wars, but at the same time especially 
strong demands are made of municipal or metropolitan tiers of government in terms of service 
delivery with local states being unable to cope with the rapid influx of people. This is often 
accompanied by increased dependence on financial transfers from the centre at the expense of 
developing their own taxation mechanisms. This has been evident in Srinagar, Kashmir 
(Venkatachalam 2007) and is exacerbated in contexts where international actors intervene and 
‘over-determine’ urban decision making ‘above the heads’ of local state institutions. As a 
result they become marginalised with long-term implications for local state capacity (Esser 
2009). This can be particularly damaging in the case of metropolitan tiers of government that 
have potentially important taxation functions and have especially strong demands made of 
them in terms of service delivery. 
 
Civic conflicts, for their part, impact on state erosion primarily at the local level: our case 
studies of Ahmedabad (Chandhoke 2009) and Karachi (Budhani et al. 2010) demonstrate how 
non-state violence can be seen as increasingly legitimate, ultimately undermining local state 
authority and consolidation. Yet their impacts do not remain solely local. As the case of 
Pakistan clearly illustrates, the erosion of the state in a city the scale of Karachi can ultimately 
contribute to national state fragility. Goma’s history illustrates how in cases of civil conflict, 
quite aside from the impacts of the conflict itself on state fragility, the fact that cities caught 
in the crossfire are able to cultivate a degree of autonomy and ‘city state’ status that in turn 
can pose further obstacles to the state’s territorial reach and may adversely affect state 
consolidation even after civil conflict has ended (Vlassenroot and Buescher 2009).  
 
The third process, state transformation, is somewhat more complex in nature, as is its 
relationship to the urban realm. State consolidation and transformation can be linked 
respectively to the notions of state resilience and development (Di John and Putzel 2009). 
State transformation or a developmental state is one that delivers growth and welfare 
alongside security, whereas a state delivering security alone is resilient and perhaps 
consolidated, but not developmental.  
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Tilly noted how in Europe rulers bargained ‘with capitalists and other classes’ in ways that 
‘created numerous new claims on the state: pensions, payments to the poor, public education, 
city planning, and much more’. This caused states to transform: in the process of bargaining, 
‘states changed from magnified war machines into multipurpose organisations’ (Tilly 1994: 
9). Many of the states we have studied lack the institutionalised processes to allow for 
bargaining to take place that includes the urban middle classes and low income groups. This 
can drive conflict, especially of the civic kind. The failure of institutions that foster or allow 
for inter-group bargaining or generative civic engagement has the effect of both increasing the 
probability of conflict and decreasing the probability of the state becoming a developmental 
‘multi-purpose organisation’. The dependence by states on the wealth of cities – not always 
the case in fragile states – should enable those who inhabit cities and drive their economies to 
make particularly emphatic claims on the state. However, this is often not the case because 
the ability to make such claims is obstructed or weakly institutionalised so that development 
suffers independently of the effects of conflict itself on development.  
 
The processes that avert violent conflict and those that usher in state transformation and 
development can (and ideally should) be one and the same. Examples of conflict being 
averted through institutionalised mechanisms for civic engagement and elite bargaining that 
brings into play powerful social actors other than the state include our studies of Bogotá and 
Medellín and to an extent Durban, where developmental coalitions emerged. More often than 
not, however, our research shows that conflict aversion and development do not go together. 
As we have seen, conflict can be deferred or suppressed and this does not necessarily mean 
inclusive development will follow.  
 
Conflict can be averted by resilient and largely peaceful yet stagnant states, such as Tanzania 
and Zambia. Here the conflicts characteristic of socio-economic change essentially have been 
‘co-opted’ through clientelistic relationships that stem from a particular type of ‘elite bargain’ 
at the centre. When the ‘elite bargain’ is broadly inclusive in that rents are shared among a 
wide range of groups, this can prevent the emergence of violent conflict. However as 
Lindemann (2010: 26) argues with respect to Zambia, this kind of inclusiveness and the 
‘corresponding peace and stability do not necessarily lead to higher state effectiveness and 
developmental outcomes’. This situation has been termed ‘resilient stagnation’ by Putzel 
(2010). With our emphasis on process and change we argue that these states have 
consolidated but have not transformed.  
 
At the urban scale as well, social tensions and violent civic conflict, often heightened by 
urbanisation itself, may be contained (resilient stagnation) rather than being channelled into 
transformative engagement. The creolisation and Swahili culture that accompanied 
urbanisation in Tanzania helped Dar es Salaam remain unusually peaceful by African city 
standards. This was not only because Swahili creolism blunted ethnic differences and was a 
source of nation building, but because at the level of the local state the Swahili tended to 
avoid involvement in politics, which ‘precluded them from being perceived as threatening’ by 
other groups (Bryceson 2008: 20). In a sense, some of the factors that have kept Dar es 
Salaam peaceful are the same as those that have prevented widespread demands being made 
on the local state in ways that might stimulate dynamic urban development. Urban social 
forces in Dar es Salaam were in a sense eclipsed and co-opted by a centralised, Swahili-based 
nation-building project that succeeded in averting conflict, while at the same time deflecting 
some of the contested bargaining processes at the local and metropolitan scale that can help 
foster state transformation.  
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In other cases, we see cities remaining in a state of ‘resilient stagnation’ only to see this break 
down due to dynamics that ultimately lie beyond the city. For example, between the end of 
Uganda’s countrywide civil war in 1986 and the outbreak of riots in late 2009, similar 
processes of clientelistic co-optation of antagonistic urban conflict were characteristic of 
politics in Kampala. Despite a much higher level of ethnic tension than in Dar es Salaam, for 
decades this did not manifest in violence, not because social tensions were channelled into 
effective institutionalised bargaining but because informal systems of rent sharing and elite 
collusion kept the lid on tensions in the city. This has been at the expense of development and 
state transformation at the metropolitan level (Goodfellow 2010). Largely due to increasing 
national level tensions that extend beyond the city, elites in Kampala have begun aggressively 
to manipulate violent civic conflict, which became a significant feature of capital city life in 
2009.  
 
Kinshasa is also a place in which conflict was avoided throughout much of the Mobutu period 
after 1965, and stability prevailed even after spiralling decay set in from the mid-1970s and 
up until the violent uprisings of the early 1990s. The rise of a unique ‘Kinois’ sensibility and 
identity probably played some part in this stability, but it is more likely associated with the 
location of the national state elite in the city and the various clientelistic networks it espoused, 
so that there has been little by way of an autonomous bourgeoisie to exert independent power 
against the state (Freund 2009). To an extent, therefore, we can think of Kinshasa as a place 
where for a lengthy period the same forces that kept conflict at bay also kept state 
transformation at bay, despite an initial phase of state consolidation (Hesselbein 2007).   
 
 
A framework for analysing conflict and state fragility in cities 
We have highlighted four different ways in which social tensions and antagonisms are 
managed in cities: i) manipulation into conflict; ii) deferral or suppression; iii) clientelistic co-
optation; and iv) channelling violent civic conflict into generative engagement. Both 
clientelist cooption and generative engagement offer the best route for avoiding conflict in the 
medium and long term; but only generative engagement is likely to combine conflict 
avoidance with dynamic development and state transformation. We do not want to overplay 
the difference between these four approaches. For example, in some cases the line between 
‘clientelistic co-optation’ of conflict and ‘deferral’ of conflict may be very thin, not to 
mention the fact that as several of our cases illustrate, the management of violent civic 
conflict in a given city may change over time, either gradually or suddenly, and can be highly 
contingent on national circumstances and international interventions. Nevertheless, they 
provide a useful analytical framework for thinking about city-level outcomes in relation to the 
erosion, consolidation or transformation of the state at the city level.  
 
In summary, our research suggests that manipulation of social tensions and antagonisms leads 
to violent outcomes and civic conflict, as well as state erosion. The consensual deferral of 
conflict or its active suppression occurs when the fatigue associated with protracted hostilities 
during a previous civil war allows governments more leeway than usual. States can take 
advantage of this peace dividend and undergo some transformation but not adequately 
consolidate. In other words, as the state takes on new developmental projects and roles it 
creates fresh antagonisms or exacerbates existing ones. The deferral of conflict does not 
necessarily consolidate the state because mechanisms for dealing with on-going and new 
social tensions are not put in place, eventually resulting in civic conflict that the state cannot 
contain. Clientelist cooption may allow the local state to consolidate by including a wide 
range of elites in rent-sharing networks that stave off conflict; but the very establishment of 
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this equilibrium may prevent the state from effectively transforming because inclusive 
development will rarely be a priority. 
  
In order to minimise violent civic conflict in both the long and short term while also allowing 
states to both consolidate and transform, the fourth approach is necessary: the establishment 
of institutionalised forms of political organisation and interaction through which the interests 
of diverse socio-economic groups vis-à-vis the state can be channelled, allowing political 
solutions to emerge from political contestation and institutionalised bargaining. The cases of 
Bogotá, Medellín (Gutierrez et al. 2009) and Durban (Beall and Ngonyama 2009), despite 
their limitations, illustrate the possibility that cities and metropolitan government offer for 
developmental coalitions to form out of intensive political engagement. These cases also 
support the need for policies that go beyond promoting ‘good governance’ and that seek and 
facilitate ‘good politics’ (White 1995). 
 
The relationships between the management of social tensions and urban civic conflict on the 
one hand, and on the other processes of state erosion, consolidation and transformation, is 
presented in schematic form in Table 1. This is suggestive and not exhaustive of all cities in 
fragile states. It is simply presented to stimulate thinking about the differential effects that 
violent civic conflict can have on fragile states depending on how it is managed. As such it 
should dispel any crude notion that cities per se are spaces where state building necessarily 
happens, or where violent conflict is an inevitable outcome.  
 
Creating channels for generative civic engagement is not simply about multiparty elections, 
which in some fragile situations can serve to precipitate conflict if advanced too soon. Rather 
it is to recognise the importance of city politics and the urban public sphere for the 
negotiation and consolidation of interest groups, from elite coalitions to trades unions, co-
operatives and civil society more broadly, so that counter-powers to the state elite become 
institutionalised. This is critical in fragile states where, as we have seen, national political 
elites are inveigled with national and international interests and are not informed by the 
challenge of bargains struck with urban economic elites. Following the idea that the 
democratic state is ‘a bargaining equilibrium or relation amongst relevant political forces’ (Di 
John and Putzel 2009), nurturing democratic channels of engagement is a means of 
strengthening the ways in which forces in society can make themselves relevant and can stake 
their place in that bargaining outcome. Cities provide concentrated opportunities for diverse 
people to come together across multiple factional, religious and ethnic divides and to coalesce 
around interests with unifying and constructive potential, often the pursuit of public goods 
that are in the arenas of local and metropolitan government. 
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Table 1: 
 
Approach to managing 
urban civic conflict Potential effect on state fragility City examples 
Manipulation into conflict Erosion Ahmedabad Karachi 
Deferral/suppression Transformation without consolidation 
Kigali 
Maputo 
Clientelistic co-optation Consolidation without transformation  
Dar Es Salaam 
Kampala 1986-2009 
Kinshasa 1965-1991 
Generative engagement Consolidation with transformation 
Bogota  
Medellin 
Durban 
 
 
Civic engagement and political mobilisation are not important simply for their own sake: they 
are steps towards developmental state building and transformation. When the field of 
institutionalised bargaining is opened up, this creates a need for strong and active states that 
can respond to new demands, driving them towards new roles as ‘multi-purpose’ 
organisations. To achieve this in fragile states the challenge is to change the logic of politics 
from one which is either about violent conflict or its suppression to one involving a 
reinvigoration of creative political contestation, and this is where cities and metropolitan 
government become important. One side of the fragile state coin is the incapacity of states to 
respond to demands, but the other is that populations do not demand enough of the state, 
largely because the mechanisms are not in place for them to do so. Stunted civil societies have 
focused on individual patrons rather than generating a culture of rights, and ultimately states 
can only achieve developmental transformation if their citizens are given and claim the 
institutional space to engage the state itself. History and our own research suggests that it is 
those most proximal to the state – urban dwellers – who both need to make this happen and 
have the greatest prospects of forming the necessary coalitions to allow it to happen.  
  
 
Conclusion and policy implications  
The Cities and Fragile States research programme of the Crisis States Research Centre was  a 
‘blue skies’ endeavour that set out to explore the relationship between cities, conflict and state 
fragility. As a broad and exploratory endeavour it did not seek to yield firm conclusions so 
much as to set in motion a research agenda and offer a framework for analysis. The purpose 
of this paper has been to draw together some of the themes from a body of research on cities 
and conflict in fragile states that comprises 32 working papers across 15 case study cities. The 
types of conflict considered – here categorised as three overarching forms of sovereign, civil 
and civic – are in reality quite diverse, as are the contextual variations between the city 
studies, and so we have not tried to address hypotheses, or answer a single question: to do so 
would be not to exploit the richness of the research output and the potential implications for 
policy that emerge.  
 
Nevertheless, the identification of conflict transitions across a large number of the city studies 
is significant, as is the deeper understanding of the dynamics of civic conflict that we offer. 
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We show not only the adverse impacts of conflict but also how social tensions and urban 
political processes can in certain circumstances reduce violent conflict when channelled 
through institutions that allow for generative outcomes. Our research has shown that this is 
both possible and increasingly necessary given the rise of civic conflict, particularly in the 
wake of sovereign and civil conflicts.  
 
In policy terms the research suggests that national-level peace settlements and reconstruction 
efforts need to take careful account of their likely impacts on cities and urban populations. 
This is so that they do not exacerbate the likelihood of violent civic conflict, which in fragile 
conditions is already high and can easily spill over from the city to regions and countries as a 
whole. However, by the same token, city-level political processes allow social groups to 
bargain, debate and form broad coalitions of interest that if supported can promote 
developmental activities in the city and ultimately state transformation beyond.   
 
Drawing on this general message, further policy implications flowing from the analysis in this 
paper are summarised as follows. Sovereign and civil wars are declining, but civic conflicts – 
encompassing various forms of violence in cities – are on the rise. These different forms of 
conflict require very different kinds of policy interventions both nationally and 
internationally. Above all is a need to acknowledge the importance of urbanisation as a factor 
in civic conflicts and the particular governance needs of cities and challenges associated with 
urban politics. The heterogeneity, density and compressed inequality that characterise cities, 
along with the frequency and intensity of interactions between populations and the state in 
urban settings, require more attention to politics and policymaking processes than in rural 
areas.  
 
Due attention needs to be paid to the often-overlooked effects of sovereign and civil conflict – 
and post-conflict reconstruction – on the local, as well as national, state; often the erosion of 
municipal state capacities has long-term implications for development. However, it is 
important to emphasise that a focus on the metropolitan scale or even the local state is not the 
same as suggesting that decentralisation is the answer. Our research shows that violent 
conflict of all kinds is likely to rupture inter-governmental interaction and communication so 
that local government in cities becomes increasingly divorced from central government. In 
other words, regardless of the depth of devolution of state powers, attention needs to be paid 
to the interaction between tiers of government – how it is preserved, fostered and 
reconfigured in both conflict and post-conflict situations.  
 
In many cases of civil war, the inability for armed groups to take control of both cities and 
countryside actually prolongs the civil war. Under these circumstances cities may remain 
relatively stable, but this does not mean that urban power brokers do not need to be taken into 
account in efforts to end the conflict. On the contrary, it implies that peace building involves 
clear efforts to bridge the rural-urban divide and to bring together stakeholders from both 
urban and rural areas. While cities are often havens of relative security in civil war, it would 
be a mistake to take urban security for granted when hostilities have ended. Major population 
movements and socio-economic ruptures often lead to widespread conflict in cities after civil 
war, and yet while contemporary military experts are acutely aware of this there has been a 
notable lack of attention to urban centres by development specialists concerned with 
humanitarianism and post-war reconstruction and development.   
 
Virtually all of our research indicates that in the wake of sovereign and civil conflict, fragile 
states continue to rapidly urbanise. Unless issues such as urban employment, housing and 
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basic services are addressed, civic conflict is likely. To simply treat the city as a central node 
for the rebuilding of national infrastructure, such as roads and telecommunications, is to 
overlook some of the profound socio-economic changes that conflict is likely to have caused 
among rapidly growing – and often increasingly poor – urban populations, all of which need 
attention in their own right.   
 
Social relations in cities are always contested, but the question is how to translate this into 
generative civic engagement rather than violent civic conflict. Simply suppressing conflict 
can be counterproductive in the medium and long term. Moreover, cities are ideal arenas in 
which to push the boundaries of democratic politics and institutionalised bargaining, insofar 
as antagonistic bargaining is often required for the emergence of consolidated interest groups 
that can act as counter-powers to the state. The urban middle classes are critical to such 
processes, but it is also important to find meaningful ways of extend political processes and 
developmental outcomes so they are more inclusive of low income groups. Elite bargains can 
be inclusive in that they often include people from all ethnic/racial/religious groups and as 
such foster state resilience at the urban level, but not necessarily development and state 
transformation. Our research suggests that when bargaining processes extend beyond elites 
new demands are made on the state, even if such demands are made through or in alliance 
with elites. This ensures state transformation and development without actively stoking 
violent conflict. The process is neither easy nor automatic as development inevitably creates 
antagonisms and new or different exclusions.  
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